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1. Introduction
Despite the fact that you have the same sabbatical schedule as everyone else, he says, 
you are always on sabbatical. You are friends so you respond, easy.
What do you mean?
Exactly, what do you mean? (Rankine, 2014, 52)
At first sight, the previous exchange does not seem to count as one where the speaker 
is being offensive: the sentence “You are always on sabbatical” seems to aim at a neutral 
possible situation, which can be or not be the case. But as Rankine asks: exactly, what is the 
meaning communicated by the speaker through their claim in the above linguistic exchange? 
Does it really count as a simple description of how things are? Is it just a false description? 
The claim appears to mean something else. Is the speaker making an evaluation? Is it a joke? 
Is what has been said offensive in any way? Exactly, what does her friend mean? How can 
we know it? More context is needed to decide. But in what sense is the meaning we convey 
through our words context-sensitive?
The purpose of this paper is to explore the boundaries of a subset of the evaluative uses 
of language: offensive speech. More in particular, our goal is twofold. On the one hand, we 
want to chart the relationship between context and evaluative utterances, as it stands in the 
current literature. Forcefully, we will highlight certain recent findings, and say way less than 
it is necessary about other important phenomena. We will also focus, on the other hand, on 
the experimental study of a particular interaction between contextual information and our 
evaluative claims—when the context is able to turn a seemingly descriptive utterance into 
an evaluative one. For this second purpose, we will argue, certain recent positive proposals, 
in spite of their merit, come a bit short.
Evaluative uses of language seem to be importantly different from descriptive ones 
concerning the information they convey, despite the fact that the sentences commonly 
uttered to make claims from both language domains are structurally similar, even identi-
cal sometimes. We will highlight four different traits to showcase this difference: what is 
expressed, commonality of standards, retraction and practicality. First, descriptive claims 
seem to be embedded in practices where there is a high level of agreement in relation to 
how our surroundings are, while evaluative ones often exhibit lesser prior agreement on it. 
If I say that my room’s door is closed, I’m simply describing how things around me are in 
an objective way, so to speak. But if I say that my room’s door is cool, I’m also expressing 
myself, and my interlocutor might have a very different appreciation about the door (Cepo-
llaro, Soria & Stojanovic, 2021) or, more importantly, about what a cool door amounts to. 
Second, descriptive and evaluative claims seem to give rise to very different situations of 
disagreement. If you and I disagree on whether the door of my room is closed, when the 
claim is just descriptive, then we seem to agree from the outset on how the dispute can be 
settled. In most scenarios, speaker and audience share common assumptions on how the 
claim could be verified. If they do not in fact share these assumptions, the situation stops 
making sense. If I suddenly discover that your preferred and only way to settle whether 
the door is closed is by asking the crystal skull that hangs from your necklace, we’re 
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not involved in a discussion about our surroundings anymore (perhaps in one about the 
shortcomings of your upbringing, or none at all). This happens far less in situations where 
the disagreement revolves around an evaluative claim (Field, 2009, 2018). It’s possible to 
discover that your musical standards are radically different from mine, and still continue 
discussing the relative greatness of Gesualdo and Palestrina. Third, retraction—understood 
as a linguistic move aimed at reassessing, from the actual context, a claim that we took to 
be true in the past—seems to work differently in descriptive and evaluative contexts: we 
demand that someone retracts evaluative statements more often than we do descriptive ones, 
while, perhaps surprisingly, it seems to be much more difficult to retract the former than the 
latter (Bordonaba & Villanueva, forthcoming). Finally, and most importantly for us here, 
evaluative claims exhibit a closer connection to action. If I say that my room’s door is cool, 
I’m presenting myself as someone from whom certain courses of action can be reasonably 
expected, while claiming that the door is closed is not particularly action-guiding when it 
just conveys information about our surroundings (Gibbard, 2012, 44).
Of these four features, perhaps retraction and practicality require a bit more attention, 
given the pivotal role that they have played in the literature. Evaluative utterances are 
often assumed to carry an action-guiding component under their sleeve (see, for instance, 
Williams, 1985, 140; Gibbard, 1990, 33; Finlay, 2004; Strandberg, 2012, 89; Charlow, 
2014; Chrisman, 2017, 27)—they provide reasons for action, they are conceptually linked 
to ulterior courses of action. We do not check and discover that our evaluative utterances 
were false, as it might be the case with descriptive utterances. I’m not simply wrong when I 
fail to live up to the courses of action that can be reasonably expected from my evaluations, 
I might be deemed irrational, a hypocrite, or someone who lacks the necessary linguistic 
competence. This, in turn, affects my ability to effectively retract my previous evaluations. 
By expressing affective attitudes, by making evaluations, I’m often inviting my audience to 
adopt a view on how things should or should not be that can have practical implications for 
those living around us. Harm can be inflicted, prejudices can be reinforced, in a way that it’s 
difficult to counter whenever I change my mind and want to take back what I said. This is 
not to say that nothing can be done about our previous evaluative utterances whenever we 
change our mind and feel the urge to say so, we just need to be aware that making things 
right might go beyond simply saying that we no longer think what we previously thought.
As we will see, much attention has been paid to the context-dependent dynamics of eva-
luative language uses, more specifically to the contextual factors that might determine that a 
given object is positively or negatively evaluated. That is, how the parameters that determine 
our appreciation of an object might change from person to person, from time to time, from 
situation to situation. Much less attention has been devoted, however, to the contextual cues 
that determine that a piece of speech is interpreted evaluatively, rather than as mere des-
cription of our surroundings—whether or not a piece of speech is able to express the kind 
of affective attitudes that might turn out to be offensive, to contribute to the discrimination 
of disenfranchised groups. Only evaluative uses of language can turn out to be offensive, 
and only offensive pieces of discourse can express hatred, even if not every evaluation is 
offensive, and not every offense expresses hatred. We will explore in this paper both the 
context-dependency of those parameters that might make an evaluation offensive, and those 
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that contribute to the evaluative—and potentially offensive—evaluation of a seemingly 
neutral utterance, where a descriptive interpretation is also available.
Amongst the recent studies that have tackled the question of whether or not a given 
piece of discourse is offensive, and why, the role of context has been brought to the fore, 
at least at two different levels. Firstly, status and speakers’ motives have been pointed out 
as deciding factors as to whether a single piece of discourse is offensive or it’s simply a 
neutral description of a given situation (Gibson et al., 2019). Secondly, the syntactic posi-
tion of the words has been highlighted as one of the factors that might determine whether 
a word is interpreted as a slur. This line has given rise to unexpected consequences (Cepo-
llaro, Sulpizio & Bianchi, 2019): slurs are perceived as more offensive than other kinds of 
insults when they are presented in isolation. However, expressions of the form “Someone is 
an X” turn out to be perceived to be less offensive when X is a slur than when it is a non-
slurring insult. Not only that, the offensive character of certain expressions only diminishes 
in indirect speech, in expressions of the form “Bilal believes that Lois is X”, but doesn’t 
disappear. Why should I be deemed as offensive for reporting on the thoughts of somebody 
else? To complicate matters even further, it remains an open question whether quoted slurs 
are potentially harmful, and thus rightfully deemed offensive, or not (Cepollaro & Zeman, 
2020; Moreno & Pérez-Navarro, manuscript).
The studies just mentioned show how to go beyond the truism that offensiveness is 
context-dependent. Claiming that whether our utterances are offensive or not depends on the 
context is by now less of a claim than it is a cue to provide more relevant information.1 This 
being so, incidentally, can provide a reasonable basis to derive a conversational implicature 
out of those cases in which supposedly knowledgeable people make that very same claim, as 
if it was all the explanation that a certain action needs to be understood. Unlike the examples 
in the studies above, our goal in this paper is not to examine the behavior of terms or phrases 
that are taken to be offensive by default, but rather to ask about expressions which are not 
usually identified as offensive, those that might ignite the most stubborn conversations about 
the nature of language, the intentions of the speakers, and so forth. We will review some of 
the contextual features that might determine how and when an otherwise perfectly descrip-
tive expression can be used to express affective attitudes, to contribute to the stereotypes that 
harm disenfranchised minorities. One of the relevant determinants of offensive speech, as 
we will see, seems to be the speaker’s status. If we turn back to Rankine’s example knowing 
that the speaker is a white person and the target person is not white, our initial intuitions 
regarding the meaning communicated will probably vary. We will also, in § 3, explain why 
we should care about these examples at all. Before any of that, more has to be said about 
the context-dependent nature of evaluative language (§ 2).
2. Offensiveness and context-dependence
A friend argues that Americans battle between the “historical self” and the “self 
self.” By this she means you mostly interact as friends with mutual interest and, for 
the most part, compatible personalities; however, sometimes your historical selves, 
1 Cryptic? True. Potentially offensive? Also true.
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her white self and your black self, or your white self and her black self, arrive with 
the full force of your American positioning. Then you are standing face-to-face in 
seconds that wipe the affable smiles right from your mouths. What did you say? Ins-
tantaneously your attachment seems fragile, tenuous, subject to any transgression of 
your historical self. And though your joined personal histories are supposed to save 
you from misunderstandings, they usually cause you to understand all too well what 
is meant. (Rankine, 2014, 20)
The purpose of this section is to review some contributions that emphasize, in different 
ways, the context-dependent nature of the evaluative. We will start by making some remarks 
about the context-dependence of evaluative judgments. Next, we will review some linguistic 
tests that, even though they are not exhaustive, point in the direction of the radical diffe-
rence between the descriptive and the evaluative in terms of their context-dependence. This 
second type of context-dependency is slightly different: evaluative judgments are highly 
context-sensitive, but determining whether a judgment is descriptive or evaluative, a prior 
step, is also highly context-dependent. Finally, we will focus on the influence exerted by 
different contextual factors in the process of determining whether the meaning of a claim is 
descriptive or evaluative/offensive.
First, evaluative uses of language are context-dependent in at least two different senses. 
One of the characterizing features of evaluative judgments seems to be its gradable and 
multidimensional nature. As McNally and Stojanovic highlighted, when we evaluate an 
object, an event, a situation, a person, etc., the evaluation can come in degrees, and we 
might hinge on different features of the context constituting the “threshold of applicability” 
(McNally & Stojanovic, 2017, 21). Evaluative adjectives—adjectives whose use by default 
is evaluative—are gradable and multidimensional. For instance, when evaluating whether a 
natural enclave is beautiful or whether someone is healthy, we can say that it is more or less 
beautiful or healthy. Moreover, we can give consideration to the regularity of the terrain, the 
sort of vegetation, the color of the sky, the number of things found there, etc., or to the state 
of their cardiovascular system, immune system, habits, cholesterol, etc. Thus, the gradability 
of an expression requires that a parameter is contextually fixed, and the parameter might 
vary from one speaker to another, from one situation to the next. Its multidimensionality, 
for its part, is characterized by a contextually-sensitive list of features that determine the 
threshold, the bar that an object has to jump over, so to speak, in order to receive positive 
or negative valence. In this sense, the features that determine whether an evaluation is going 
to be positive or negative depend on the context.
Furthermore, the relative weight of each of the dimensions involved in setting the thres-
hold might vary from context to context (McNally & Stojanovic, 2017; Cepollaro, Soria & 
Stojanovic, 2021). For instance, I might take into consideration the regularity of the terrain 
much more than any other parameter when deciding which place is more beautiful to take 
a walk, but give more weight to the color of the sky when deciding which place is more 
beautiful to lay down and watch the clouds passing by. And I might give much more weight 
to a person’s cardiovascular state when deciding who is healthy enough to play on a sports 
team, but give less value to that parameter in another situation. It might even be the case that 
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the relative weight of each dimension varies when considering two different places while 
deciding which one is more beautiful for a walk.
Second, a number of theories have accommodated value-related information within the 
realm of pragmatics, a highly context-dependent layer of meaning (see, for instance, Corre-
dor, 2014). This realm includes approaches that place certain contextual information beyond 
what we literally say, in the range of what we implicate or presuppose by saying what we 
say. That is, our utterances can convey information that isn’t part of the literal meaning of 
the sentences we utter, and do so by exploiting certain linguistic mechanisms and conver-
sational principles. The main theoretical notions within this strand are presuppositions and 
different types of implicatures: conventional, generalized conversational and particularized 
conversational implicatures.
Several authors have defended a presuppositional account of different sorts of evaluative 
judgments and expressions (see, for example, Macià, 2002; Cepollaro, 2015, 2016, 2017a, 
2017b; Cepollaro & Stojanovic, 2016). The main point of this approach is that it situates 
the evaluative meaning at the level of what is taken for granted. For instance, if I evaluate 
Loyiso Gola’s special Unlearning by saying that it is powerful, I might literally mean that 
the show has a strong effect on people’s thought, and trigger the evaluative presupposition 
that things that have a strong effect on people’s thought are good precisely because they do 
so. That is, our evaluations, at least in some cases, implicitly take for granted a certain pers-
pective, a certain set of beliefs concerning what is good and what is bad, which is situated 
at the level of what is presupposed.
Other authors situate the meaning conveyed by evaluative uses of language at the level 
of what is conventionally implicated (see, for example, Stenner, 1981; Potts, 2005, 2007; 
Copp, 2009; Whiting, 2007, 2013; Williamson, 2009; McCready, 2010; Gutzman, 2011). 
Implicatures are pieces of information conveyed by what we say, that is, information that 
goes beyond the literal meaning expressed through an utterance. Some implicatures are part 
of the conventional meaning of what is literally said. As Abbot claims, presuppositions and 
conventional implicatures are “close neighbors” (Abbott, 2006, 2). In contrast to presup-
positions, conventionally implicated information is not taken for granted but inferentially 
conveyed. For instance, if I evaluate Loyiso Gola’s show Unlearning by saying that it is 
powerful, I conventionally implicated the proposition that Loyiso Gola’s show is good, given 
the conventional meaning of “powerful”.
The two further types of implicatures, particularized and generalized conversational ones, 
are implicated pieces of information that exploit conversational rules. They allow us to res-
tore the conversational order when some basic rule is apparently bent. The main difference 
between them is their degree of context-dependence. Particularized implicatures require 
some special contextual features, while generalized ones arise in the absence of particular 
circumstances that would defeat it (see Väyrynen, 2013). As an example of a conversational 
implicature, take the utterance of the sentence “It lasts more than an hour” as a response to 
the question “How was the show?” to implicate that it was not good.
As we have seen, the specific valence of our evaluations depends on the context in 
at least two ways: the features that determine the positive or negative valence of a jud-
gment depend on the context, and the relative weight of those features might also vary 
from context to context. Moreover, a good number of theories have accommodated the 
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information conveyed through our evaluative judgments within the realm of pragmatics, 
a highly context-dependent layer of meaning. When a judgment is identified as an evalua-
tive one, then it is highly context-dependent, in different senses. However, there is a third 
issue that might also need the intervention of context. By way of example: dogwhistles. 
Dogwhistles are a sort of political manipulation that some carry out to covertly obtain cer-
tain political benefits. Succinctly, they are pieces of speech that convey certain information 
which is consciously or unconsciously received just by a subset of the general audience 
(Saul, 2018; Torices, 2021). Only under certain very specific circumstances can a piece of 
public discourse be interpreted as a dogwhistle, taken to express affective attitudes only 
to a given proper subset of the target audience, while remaining “neutral” to the rest of it. 
Only with respect to this subset of the audience is it able to contribute to the promotion 
of negative stereotypes, to be offensive. This selective expression of hatred carried out by 
dogwhistling is also highly context-dependent. Note, however, that context plays a role 
here not only once the judgment is identified as an evaluative one, but in a previous step. 
The claim will express affective attitudes or it will not, will be an evaluative claim or it 
will not, depending on the context.
So, there are linguistic phenomena characterized by promoting certain affective attitudes 
in a subset of the general audience whose success is also highly context-dependent. In this 
sense, the role played by the context in the determination of the meaning conveyed through 
an utterance generalizes a bit further. Determining whether a piece of discourse is evaluative 
or descriptive, potentially offensive or “neutral”, also requires taking into account several 
features of the context. At the beginning of this paper, we have already introduced some 
intuitive and powerful tests to differentiate a factual claim from an evaluative one: what is 
expressed, commonality of standards, retraction and practicality. Let’s add two more tests 
to be able to spot gradable and multidimensional predicates, the kind of expressions that 
are typically involved in evaluative claims. A descriptive claim such as “Gola’s show was 
recorded at 3 PM” does not admit of degrees—e.g., “# Gola’s show was very / slightly / 
more recorded at 3 PM than the previous one”. Neither it is possible to distinguish different 
respects playing a role—e.g., “# Gola’s show was recorded at 3PM in every / some respect 
/ with respect to”. However, an evaluative claim such as “Gola’s show was nice” does 
admit degrees—e.g., “Gola’s show was very / slightly nicer than the previous one—and 
multidimensionality—e.g., Gola’s show was nice in every / some respect / with respect to the 
performance, but not with respect to the plot (Cepollaro, Soria & Stojanovic 2021). Being 
gradable is a cue of being evaluative, though it does not warrant it. Not every gradable and 
multidimensional adjective, or predicative expression, is used to make evaluations, and not 
every evaluation is made with the aid of these expressions. Firstly, any multidimensional and 
gradable adjective can be used descriptively in a context in which the standards are fixed. 
Secondly, given the appropriate context, almost any predicative expression can be used to 
make an evaluation, once it is established that possessing that particular feature is associated 
with a valence, positive or negative.
Soria and Stojanovic have distinguished some additional tests (Soria & Stojanovic, 
2019). The first one is the juxtaposition with “although”-type connectives test, based on 
the action-guidance of the evaluative. The idea is that a complex sentence composed of 
two sentences connected by the conjunction “although”, establishing a contrast between 
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a claim and a practical attitude, seems felicitous only when the claim is evaluative. For 
instance, the evaluative claim “Nassim thinks that eating meat is wrong, although she 
consumes twice more meat than average” seems felicitous, while the descriptive claim 
“Nassim thinks that eating meat is unpopular, although she consumes twice more meat 
than average” does not. Another test is the lack of epistemic justification. The idea is that 
specific evaluative judgments, such as claiming “I’ve just watched Gola’s show and it’s 
amazing”, won’t admit the question “How do you know?”, while descriptive claims such 
as “Gola’s show lasts one hour and a half” does. Finally, we also have the lack of lying 
potential test. Evaluative claims do not admit the reply “That’s a lie”, in part because they 
are a genuine expression of our own perspective. For instance, the claim “This show is 
amazing” cannot be replied by saying “That’s a lie”, while a descriptive one such as “This 
show is the second one of her career” can. As shown above with the first two features 
highlighted in this linguistic road to the evaluative, these tests also fall short from being 
conclusive. It’s perfectly OK to inquire into the reasons for a given evaluation, especially 
if the topic is important to us, or we are close to the speaker. “The White Album better 
than Abbey Road? I can’t believe you said that!”, “How can you take A over B?”, “The 
White Album better than Abbey Road? Are you sure about that?” all seem perfectly fine 
to us, evaluative claims where the grounds are explicitly questioned. Seemingly, instances 
can be found of evaluative claims followed by “That’s a lie”. Imagine you keep telling 
a child for years “Eat your beans, they’re delicious”. Years later, the now-adolescent 
discovers that you’d rather skip a meal than eating beans and protests: “You hated beans, 
and yet you kept telling me they were delicious, you were lying to me the whole time!!”.
The first of the tests mentioned above requires a bit more consideration. It hinges on 
the particular connection with our practical commitments that evaluative utterances seem 
to have, where the uptake seems to change the practical commitments of participants in 
the conversation. This rings true enough, it looks reasonable to assume that if I’m taking 
part in a conversation, and I let an evaluative claim be made unchallenged, the speaker has 
every reason to suppose that I also believe what they expressed. If we do not react to racist 
claims, we are contributing to the normalization of these words, and potentially reinforcing 
negative stereotypes. On the other hand, it also looks a bit excessive as a requirement for 
evaluative uses of language. A perfectly evaluative utterance can be understood, and be given 
a pass, even if we disagree with the claim, or with the way it is expressed. It’s too strong to 
demand from every participant in a conversation the attitude of a linguistic vigilante, ready 
at all times to deny the uptake to evaluative utterances, whenever there’s a disagreement. 
Sometimes staying quiet is required to let others find their way on their own. Speakers need 
to be given the chance to recognize the attitudes that they express, even if they were not 
aware of them before making their utterances, and this is much easier, in most contexts, if 
we do not adopt the attitude of linguistic vigilantes. Again, Claudia Rankine captures both 
intuitions beautifully in the following passage:
Another friend tells you you have to learn not to absorb the world. She says some-
times she can hear her own voice saying silently to whomever—you are saying 
this thing and I am not going to accept it. Your friend refuses to carry what doesn’t 
belong to her.
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You take in things you don’t want all the time. The second you hear or see some ordi-
nary moment, all its intended targets, all the meanings behind the retreating seconds, 
as far as you are able to see, come into focus. Hold up, did you just hear, did you 
just say, did you just see, did you just do that? Then the voice in your head silently 
tells you to take your foot off your throat because just getting along shouldn’t be an 
ambition. (Rankine, 2014, 55)
All these tests, even if they are not always completely effective, showcase the difference 
between the descriptive and the evaluative. But, beyond the features that the evaluative 
exhibits so far, such as the difference in what is expressed, commonality of standards, 
retraction and practicality; beyond the context-dependence, in different senses, of evaluative 
judgments, and beyond the linguistic particularities that are sometimes exhibited by the 
expressions that we use to evaluate, there is more that we need to know concerning when a 
seemingly neutral statement is indeed used to express affective attitudes. This is also highly 
context-dependent. The relationship between contextual information and our linguistic beha-
vior conducive to conveying evaluations is a complex one, and the limitations of the criteria 
pointed above tell this story. Our purpose in this paper, as stated in the introduction, is to 
chart a conceptual map of the territory, exploring the benefits and shortcomings of the posi-
tive proposals contained in the recent literature, but also to point to a different territory, one 
that involves experimental philosophy and that will require more attention in the near future.
Recently, we have conducted two empirical studies on the influence of different contex-
tual factors in assessing the same statement as simply informative or also offensive (Alma-
gro, Hannikainen & Villanueva, 2021). In this research, we took into consideration different 
contextual features. In particular, we designed a first study with a set of 8 vignettes where 
a speaker utters a seemingly descriptive sentence, and manipulated three contextual factors: 
speaker status, speaker intention, and harm caused to the audience. All participants viewed 
eight vignettes telling a short story in which a speaker claims something, and each partici-
pant was exposed to a randomized combination of factors in each vignette. Then, we asked 
each participant to rate from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) the following claims 
after reading each scenario: “The speaker simply offers information”; “The speaker is being 
offensive”. We added an additional question about the acceptability of the claim with two 
available options: “The speaker shouldn’t say that kind of thing” / “I don’t see any problem 
in the speaker saying that kind of thing”. Our results showed that for participants, although 
the three factors’ effect was significant, the speaker’s status played a more important role 
than the intention and the outcome factors in taking the same statement as offensive and 
prohibited (in a second study we have disambiguated between speakers’ membership and 
social status, and membership appears to exert a greater effect). So, according to these 
findings, all three factors are relevant, and speaker’s status and membership are even more 
important contextual factors in determining whether a claim expresses affective attitudes 
or just conveys descriptive information. Moreover, status seemed to play a more important 
role than agents were willing to explicitly acknowledge, when asked directly. Thus, the 
context does not only affect our evaluations because our standards are diverse and might 
change from situation to situation; whether some utterance is deemed as evaluative—and 
potentially offensive—or not can only be determined by paying attention to features of the 
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context such as: who’s speaking, what are the potential consequences of the utterance, and 
what intention is reasonable to attribute to the speaker.
Let’s turn now to the initial example of this section. What did the speaker say by claiming 
that Americans battle between the “historical self” and the “self self”? Was it good or bad? 
Is what they said offensive? The moral of this section is that before examining the context 
to check what standards are in play, we need to consider the actual expressions used and 
their potential occurrences in other linguistic contexts, but also the status of the speaker and 
the audience, their intentions, and the possible consequences.
3. Why should we care?
A woman you do not know wants to join you for lunch. You are visiting her campus. 
In the café you both order the Caesar salad. This overlap is not the beginning of 
anything because she immediately points out that she, her father, her grandfather, 
and you, all attended the same college. She wanted her son to go there as well, but 
because of affirmative action or minority something—she is not sure what they are 
calling it these days and weren’t they supposed to get rid of it?—her son wasn’t 
accepted. You are not sure if you are meant to apologize for this failure of your alma 
mater’s legacy program; instead you ask where he ended up. The prestigious school 
she mentions doesn’t seem to assuage her irritation. This exchange, in effect, ends 
your lunch. The salads arrive. (Rankine, 2014, 19)
Although it might appear to be a simple description, saying to a non-white person that 
you wanted your son to go to her college but that he wasn’t accepted because of affirmative 
action or minority something is offensive, even if you didn’t intend it that way. Take the 
following case. In 2008, Phil Edwards and Ian Roberts published a short piece in the British 
peer-reviewed general medical journal The Lancet. In this article, the authors tackled the 
issue of global food insecurity and climate change. In particular, they made the point that 
reducing the demand for transportation fuel is important for reducing food prices in two 
senses (Edwards & Roberts, 2008). The first argument offered by the authors is as follows: 
motorized transport is more than 95% oil-dependent. Since oil is a key agricultural input, 
demand for transportation fuel increases its price, and then affects food prices. The second 
argument goes like this: increased car use contributes to rising food prices by promoting 
obesity, which increases the global demand for food. Additionally, more transportation fuel 
energy will be used to transport the increased mass of the obese population. Their arguments 
were presented under a descriptive guise:
We estimate that a population of 1 billion people with a stable mean body-mass index 
(BMI) of 24·5 kg/m2 consumes an average 6·5 MJ of food energy per person per day 
to maintain basal metabolic rate, and a further 4 MJ per person per day for activities 
of daily living. An obese population of 1 billion people with a stable mean BMI of 
29·0 kg/m2 would require an average 7 MJ of food energy per person per day to 
maintain basal metabolic rate, and 5·4 MJ per person per day for activities of daily 
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living. Compared with the normal weight population, the obese population consumes 
18% more food energy. (Edwards & Roberts, 2008)
From this, the authors concluded that “urban transport policies that promote walking and 
cycling would reduce food prices by reducing the global demand for oil, and promotion of 
a normal distribution of BMI would reduce the global demand for, and thus the price of, 
food” (Edwards & Roberts, 2008). Although this contribution might be initially seen just as a 
descriptive one, and it is presumably written with that intention, some media reports echoed 
Edwards and Roberts’ findings under headlines such as “Obese blamed for the world’s ills”. 
In the same journal, Harald Schmidt wrote a reply to the authors claiming that Edwards and 
Roberts’ discussion of the role of overweight people in climate change is ethically problema-
tic (Schmidt, 2008). He claims that some important alternatives to the authors’ hypothesis, 
such as cutting unnecessary transport, using alternative fuels, lighter materials in vehicles, 
etc., are neither considered nor acknowledged, and that it makes it more problematic to 
advocate that reducing weight is a key priority in fighting against climate change and food 
prices. So, their contribution, he concludes, counts as an instance of victim blaming of an 
already marginalized and vulnerable population.
In addition to the authors’ narrow analysis that leads to focus on a single possible expla-
nation that, as a result, blames certain people from a disenfranchised group, there are other 
rather problematic assumptions in play. For instance, Edwards and Roberts assume that 
someone’s body-mass is always proportional to the intake of a particular amount of food 
energy, which is a stereotype. It is also assumed that there is a normal body-mass index, 
which makes other body-mass indexes of healthy people seem abnormal. Empirical studies 
have shown that the use of terms such as “obese”, “fat”, etc., as “descriptive” as they might 
look in a scientific context, promotes negative attitudes towards people to whom such pre-
dicates are applied (see, for instance, Brochu & Esses, 2011).
Nevertheless, it can be convincingly argued that doing all this was not the authors’ 
intention. Presumably, the authors’ purpose was simply to genuinely make a contribution 
to the topic, and not to blame anyone. However, the meaning of our words is beyond our 
acknowledged intentions, and we seem to be especially bad at knowing our own minds. 
For example, we might be completely honest when we say that we consider all races to be 
equal, and yet still display racist attitudes in our linguistic and nonlinguistic behavior. The 
evaluative nature of the information we convey through our verbal and nonverbal actions 
gives us clues about our own personality, what to keep and what to try and keep in check.
In our study presented above, we also found some surprising results along this line. 
At the end of the experiment, we included a general final question in which we explicitly 
asked about the influence of the three factors (speaker’s status, intention, and the outcome) 
when considering the same statement as offensive or not. Participants had to rate from 1 
(little influence) to 7 (much influence) speaker status, speaker intention, and the harm felt 
by the audience. Although participants had shown through their concrete case-by-case res-
ponses that the identity of the speaker, both in terms of membership and social status, is 
the contextual factor that most affected their responses in considering the same statement 
as offensive or neutral, when approached in an abstract way, participants rated the speaker’s 
intention as the most relevant factor, and the speaker’s identity as the least important. So, 
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it can be concluded that most of the participants in our study sincerely say that they think 
that the speaker’s intention is the most relevant contextual factor in considering a claim as 
descriptive or offensive, but that they don’t actually think so, given their responses in spe-
cific situations. This result is in line with other research suggesting that we have systematic 
blindspots regarding our own mental states (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Zajonc, 2001; Wilson, 
2002; Schwitzgebel, 2008, 2011; Carruthers, 2011). Our evaluations can make us realize an 
aspect of our personality, of our mind, that we could have otherwise ignored.
Perhaps this realization comes a bit too late, only when we catch ourselves promoting the 
kind of stereotypes that reinforce the discrimination against disenfranchised groups, we do 
acknowledge that perhaps there was an aspect of our personality that we needed to address. 
It’s too late to take our utterance back, and the harm is probably already done, but it might 
be one of the very few ways to access those dispositions of our own, and we’d better keep 
them in mind. Take an implicit test, trust those that are close to you, pay attention to what 
you say, perhaps inadvertently, especially when you are called out on that. What did you 
say? Exactly, what did you mean? Besides giving information about our own mind, evalua-
tions promote negative attitudes and have other pernicious consequences, especially when 
they are unnoticeably made or presented under a descriptive guise. For instance, Samuel 
Huntington’s contribution to the Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral 
Commission, published in 1975, was to argue that the problems of the United States in the 
1970s result from “an excess of democracy”. His recommendation for the United States, as 
Stanley puts it, was “to try to reinstall some measure of obedience to authority by making 
various central domains in life, ones that should be governed democratically, the domain of 
experts” (Stanley, 2015, 40). That is, Huntington was recommending to take certain matters 
of value as if they were factual ones. Appealing to experts as if they have the last word 
when deciding about a normative issue is covertly making an evaluation, presenting it as if 
it were a description. In doing so, one may appear to be making a reasonable contribution 
when in fact one is undermining certain democratic ideals as Stanley points out. The subtle 
effect exerted by different contextual factors on the meaning conveyed through a claim, 
together with our inability to clearly identify the influence exerted by these factors, makes 
us especially vulnerable to situations such as the previous ones. If Edwards and Roberts say 
that they didn’t intend to be offensive, then someone might conclude erroneously that what 
they said is not offensive, and that it counts as a reasonable contribution. Similarly, one 
might wrongly conclude that, since Huntington appealed to experts, he was talking about a 
factual issue, and that he was making a reasonable contribution.
This move can be done to advance certain political agendas. As Kappel puts it, “in some 
cases, there might be strategic advantages to framing a disagreement as fact-dependent, even 
when it is not. Or conversely, disagreements may be framed as value-dependent, when they 
are really fact dependent, and so on” (Kappel, 2017, 317). In particular, this move generates 
situations of crossed disagreements (Osorio & Villanueva, 2019). A crossed disagreement 
is a situation in which each of the parties of a genuine disagreement displays clear signs of 
conceiving the dispute in significantly different terms, e.g., one conceives it in descriptive 
terms, and the other as if it were a normative dispute. One of the pernicious consequences 
of the systematic confusion of the descriptive and the evaluative in public debates is that 
they foster polarization: crossed disagreements expand the pool of arguments supporting 
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the views held by each party (Osorio & Villanueva, 2019; Almagro, Osorio & Villanueva, 
2021), which in turn contributed to the raise of polarization. In other words, increasing the 
size and density of the pool of arguments that one is exposed to fosters polarization: when 
we are exposed to a limited group of arguments just in favor of one position, especially 
when they are frequently repeated, we tend to become more impervious to others’ reasons 
(Sunstein, 2017; Barberá et al., 2015; Vicario et al., 2016). Since the rise of polarization 
increases distrust in public institutions and governments, it makes citizens less likely to 
seek different perspectives on controversial topics, and corrodes the proper functioning of 
democratic institutions, among other things (see Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018; Carothers & 
O’Donohue, 2019), the systematic confusion of the descriptive and the normative in public 
debates is pretty dangerous.
In this paper we’ve taken a much more personal approach, focusing on cases where the 
speakers are expressing hatred through apparently descriptive claims. Let’s briefly present 
other cases in this vein. In a scientific article, Simko and Ginter concluded that the uncon-
trolled sugar consumption leading to high rates of diabetes explains the low life expectancy 
of the Roma population in Europe (Simko & Ginter, 2010), ignoring many other relevant 
data, such as that Roma population regularly appears in the Eurobarometer as the minority 
to which the rest of the people in Europe feel less affinity, have less access to resources, 
suffer more poverty, etc. Their food choices might not be a result of their culture or their 
way of life, but the sheer consequence of their low income. A recent report on disparities 
in the risk and outcomes of COVID-19 in the United Kingdom (Public Health England, 
2020), while it recognizes that non-white males have been more likely to die from a COVID-
19-related condition than White males, highlights that “an analysis of over 10,000 patients 
with COVID-19 admitted to intensive care in UK hospitals suggests that, once age, sex, 
obesity and comorbidities are taken into account, there is no difference in the likelihood of 
being admitted to intensive care or of dying between ethnic groups”, and adds that people 
of non-white groups “are also more likely than people of White British ethnicity to be born 
abroad, which means they may face additional barriers in accessing services that are created 
by, for example, cultural and language differences”. In doing so, again, they come short of 
blaming people from some disenfranchised groups for their bad fortune, which is highly 
offensive and promotes negative attitudes towards them, despite the authors neither having 
this intention nor using a language that is clearly evaluative.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored the boundaries of offensive speech, a subset of eva-
luative uses of language. In particular, we have focused on the contextual dependence of 
offensive speech: the contextual cues that determine that a piece of speech is interpreted 
evaluatively, rather than as mere description of our surroundings, and is thus able to 
express the kind of affective attitudes that might contribute to the discrimination of dis-
enfranchised groups. First, we have dwelt on how context affects evaluative meaning. As 
we have seen, our evaluations depend on a variety of contextual features, and the relative 
weight of those features also varies from context to context. Second, we have briefly 
reviewed some approaches to the evaluative from the realm of pragmatics, the classic 
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locus of context-dependence. Then, we have focused on a more general issue: how the 
context plays a role in determining whether a piece of speech expresses affective attitudes 
or remains neutral. We have revisited different tests and remarks that can help us to know 
whether a claim is descriptive or evaluative, and we have introduced an empirical study 
that we have recently conducted on the influence exerted by three contextual factors in 
determining whether a statement counts as a descriptive or evaluative one: speaker’s sta-
tus, speaker’s intention and outcome. Finally, we have discussed several cases where the 
speaker’s claim seems to be descriptive but it actually expresses affective attitudes towards 
certain groups of people, and showed why they are problematic and why we need to be 
able to recognize when a claim is an evaluative one.
The goal of this paper started from the need of making explicit certain forms of injustice 
that frequently go unnoticed, in order to be able to fight against them. In this sense, it belongs 
to the political turn in analytic philosophy (Pinedo & Villanueva, forthcoming). The defining 
feature of this political turn is taking our raw perceptions of injustice as the starting point, 
and bringing to the fore the capacity of our philosophical tools in detecting and intervening 
on oppressive and unjust practices. Our best theories will be the ones that more efficiently 
serve this purpose: identifying and intervening in certain social injustices.
Words work as release—well-oiled doors opening and closing between intention, 
gesture. A pulse in a neck, the shiftiness of the hands, an unconscious blink, the con-
versations you have with your eyes translate everything and nothing. What will be 
needed, what goes unfelt, unsaid—what has been duplicated, redacted here, redacted 
there, altered to hide or disguise—words encoding the bodies they cover. And despite 
everything the body remains.
Occasionally it is interesting to think about the outburst if you would just cry out—
To know what you’ll sound like is worth noting. (Rankine, 2014, 69)
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